A review of the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study found 317 incidents which involved problems with ventilation. The major portion (47%) were disconnections; 61% of these were detected by a monitor. Monitor detection was by a low circuit pressure alarm in 37% but this alarm failed to warn of non-ventilation in 12 incidents (in 6 because it was not switched ''on'' and in 6 because of a failure to detect the disconnection). Failure of detection was usually with ventilator bellows descending in expiration.
Problems with ventilation have long been identified as a major area of difficulty in anaesthesia. Analysis of closed claims studies from the USA found respiratory events to be the largest part of the total claims, and inadequate ventilation as the biggest subgroup within respiration. I Respiratory problems also account for a large part of insurance claims and morbidity in the United Kingdom 2 and in Australia. 3 In keeping with these mortality and morbidity studies, respiratory events also are a major proportion of incidents found during anaesthesia. Cooper, Newbower and Kitz reported in 1984 that breathing circuit disconnections formed 11 070 of critical incidents and were the largest single group. 4 In 1989 Curry reported on incidents in two Australian hospitals; she found that airway and circuitry events were numerous but did not find that disconnection was the most frequent event in this category. 5 It was therefore of interest to see if more recent reports since the availability of pulse oximetry and capnometry would show any difference in pattern.
To investigate the occurrence and the type of ventilation problems which occur in clinical anaesthetic practice, it was decided to study the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS).
METHODS
AIMS has been an on-going project of the Australian Patient Safety Foundation, and involves the voluntary, anonymous reporting of any unintended incident which reduced or could have reduced the safety margin for the patient. The AIMS methods have been described elsewhere in this symposium. 6 The AIMS database was searched for the keywords "circuitry" or "airway' '. From these categories, those incidents that had occurred in preparation for or during general anaesthesia and which involved an equipment problem affecting ventilation of the patient were selected. Note that this classification includes incidents before the induction of anaesthesia but excludes a few incidents after emergence. Hence the set of incidents studied here di ffers from that used for the analysis of the role of monitors with general anaesthesia. 7 Each incident was analysed for the cause of disruption to ventilation of the patient, and the result of that disruption (e.g. total failure to ventilate or reduced ventilation). Incidents were also examined to find out what first alerted the anaesthetist to the problem, and what associated factors caused or contributed to the disruption.
All incident reports which had "failure to check" marked, were re-examined to ascertain if the appropriate general check recommended by the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists had been performed. If an appropriate check had not been performed before the beginning of the case, "nocheck" was marked in the database. This more rigorous definition was used because "failure to check" was sometimes ticked in the contributing factor list, though it was apparent from the narrative that the cause, such as sudden component failure, could not have been detected before induction.
Statistical analysis of frequency data was by Chisquare with Yates correction for 2 x 2 tables. For all data, a 2-sided probability estimate was chosen.
RESULTS
It was considered that 317 incidents were applicable to this analysis; of these 148 were disconnections of the breathing circuit, and 129 were leaks which affected ventilation. A further 36 incidents involved misconnection of anaesthetic equipment. One incident of misconnection was associated with a disconnection and a further incident of misconnection was associated with a large leak. There were 6 incidents which did not fit into the three main categories.
Disconnections
Disconnections were associated with a total loss of the ability to ventilate in 78070 of incidents. Most disconnection incidents were detected first by a monitor (61070) and in 55 incidents (37070), this was the low pressure alarm. The role of monitors is considered elsewhere in this symposium; disconnect ions at or before the common gas outlet presented particular difficulties in detection and localization."" Almost half (46070) of the disconnection incidents were during surgery on the head or neck. This may relate to the remoteness of the anaesthetist from the airway during this type of surgery, but this situation also may allow the surgical team to place force on the breathing connections during surgical manipulations. In 51 incidents of disconnection (34070), a third party, either a surgeon, nurse, radiographer or technician moved or put traction on the circuit causing the disconnection.
In 28 incidents, the disconnection occurred at a monitor connection. In 16 of these, the monitor was a Hewlett-Packard mainstream capnometer. It would appear that in some of these monitors the plastic connections do not fit sufficiently firmly.
The commonest time for a disconnection to occur was during the maintenance phase of anaesthesia. The frequency of problems during each phase of anaesthesia is shown in Table I . Leaks Leaks were less likely to be associated with a total loss of ability to ventilate. Only in 19 of the 129 incidents involving leaks was ventilation totally lost. In contrast to incidents involving disconnection, only 29070 of incidents with leaks were first detected by monitors.
Similarly, it was less common (9/129) for a third party to be the cause, although 25070 of leaks occurred during head or neck surgery. As with disconnections, most leaks (57070) were discovered during the maintenance phase, but more leaks than disconnections were identified either before or at induction of anaesthesia (Table I) .
Misconnections
There were 36 incident reports involving a misconnection of equipment. Only 17070 of these resulted in a patient not being ventilated. The commonest misconnections involved the scavenging system (11 reports) and co-axial circuits (6 reports). Usually the misconnection was discovered by the anaesthetist or other staff, but in one third of reports the alarm was raised by a monitor. The majority of misconnections were discovered at the beginning of the case, but 17 of the 36 were not found until the maintenance phase of anaesthesia (Table I) 
Failure to ventilate
There were 143 incidents in which the ability to ventilate the patient was completely lost for a period. In 116 of these reports, the cause was a disconnection in the circuit. In a further nineteen, the cause was a leak so severe that ventilation was not possible. In 11 of these the cause was a lack of a gas-tight seal in the absorber. One was in a single canister absorber design which cannot be sealed when the canister is removed. In five of the incidents the leak was caused by sodalime grit on the seal or a broken "0" ring. Seven incidents were the result of misconnections in the circuit, and in_.one incident there was misassembly of a Penlon ventilator valve.
In twelve out of the 143 incidents, an alternative ventilation technique was employed. In eight, this was expired-air respiration by the anaesthetist (mouth to tracheal tube on 7 occasions and mouth to mouth on 1). In another four incidents, an emergency selfinflating bag was used. 
Detection of non-ventilation
The pattern of detection varied between the types of incident and is shown in Table 2 . The commonest method of detection of non-ventilation with a disconnection was by the low pressure circuit alarm (47070), either as a specific monitor within the circuit or integrated within the ventilator. However in 6 incidents, it was specifically noted that the low pressure alarm did not detect a disconnection because it was not switched "on". In a further 6 incidents, the low pressure alarm should have detected the disconnection but failed to do so; 5 of these were with a ventilator in which the bellows descend during expiration. In another 3 incidents the capnograph alarm was switched "off" so the capnograph did not warn of the disconnection. In one incident a similar disabling of the pulse oximeter prevented it warning of a disconnection. Overall, after the low circuit pressure alarm, the next most frequent method of detection of non-ventilation was human observation (46 times, 32070 of incidents).
There were 21 reports of detection by other than the four ways noted in Table 2 . On 15 occasions (13070 of incidents), the disconnection was noticed by a "chattering" or change in sound of the ventilator. In two incidents, the entrainment of air by the descending bellows of the Campbell ventilator triggered the oxygen analyser within the breathing circuit. In two other incidents, loss of flow within the breathing circuit triggered the spirometer alarm. One incident was detected by the ECG as the progressive hypoxia triggered a profound bradycardia, and one incident triggered a low temperature alarm on a Fisher Paykel humidifier because of the loss of gas flow in the circuit. Complete non-ventilation caused by a leak was most likely to be clinically observed before detection by a monitor detected. Four detections were unusual. One leak caused "ventilator chatter", two were detected by the spirometer alarm, and one by an alarm from an oxygen analyser.
Factors contributing to the incident
The main contributing factor reported was a "failure to check" which was ticked on the form in 108 of the 317 incidents. However, in retrospect, this represented severe self-judgement by the reporting anaesthetist on at least some occasions. When the forms were reviewed with the question, "could this incident have been prevented by detection of the problem at the machine check before anaesthesia commenced?", only 61 (56070) were classified as associated with an absent or inadequate check (no-check). Most of the remainder involved sudden and unexpected problems such as disconnection at the patient "Y-piece" during anaesthesia, valve domes blowing off, or a sudden release of the top of the lid of the absorber.
A further factor in the incidents associated with ventilation problems appears to be the use of an anaesthetic induction room. There were 33 incidents associated with the use of an induction room. In thirteen (39070) of these, the problem was caused by a lack of checking (no-check), usually of the anaesthetic equipment in the operating theatre to which the patient was to be transferred. This represents a significantly greater frequency of "no-check" than the overall "nocheck" rate of 21070 (x 2 = 6.2 P=O.013). In contrast, the rate of sudden and unexpected equipment failure in the induction room (6/33) was similar to that in the operating theatre (321284) (i =0.76 P=0.38).
DISCUSSION
It would appear that problems with ventilation are still very much with us, and that they are occurring at all levels. It is appreciated that the incident reports we have are unlikely to represent the true pattern of disconnections, leaks and misconnections, but rather a selection of the more serious and unexpected occurrences. It is a very common experience for all anaesthetists that a disconnection of a breathing hose occurs during anaesthesia. In most cases it is observed to happen, and is immediately corrected; it is considered by many to be a normal part of anaesthesia. However, the fact that disconnections and leaks constitute over one-quarter of all applicable incidents associated with general anaesthesia underlines the need for a high level of vigilance.
The high association between disconnections and loss of ventilation is not surprising. What, however, may be surprising, is that about one third of the disconnections were caused by a third party. This emphasises the need for increased vigilance when the head and neck are not immediately under the anaesthetist's control and when there is movement of the operating table or circuit hoses for secondary purposes such as radiological examination.
That a monitoring component was the cause of disconnection in a significant number of incidents, is of concern. Monitors are intended to prevent hazards, not cause them. There would appear to be a special problem with main-stream carbon dioxide monitors, particularly as on many of these units the apnoea alarm can be disabled with no obvious indication. This is contrary to the advice in the Australian Standard on Audible and Visible Alarm signals. 10 Possibly, the bulky detector-head of the main-stream system increases the risk of disconnection. Side-stream sampling systems do not appear to be prone to disconnection, but some leak incidents occurred with side-stream sampling connections because either the sampling tube had fractured or the tube had become disconnected. "
Misconnections appear to be commonly due to junior medical, nursing or technical staff being unfamiliar with equipment. There are still problems with scavenging connections. As well as misconnections between the scavenging hose adjustable pressurelimiting (APL) valve and the ventilator, which have been described in the literature, 11 misconnections of the scavenging suction to the fresh gas nipple also were reported.
The failure at times of low pressure circuit alarms and capnographs during anaesthesia underlines the need for critical areas to be doubly or triply moni-tored. '.9 Mechanically ventilated patients should be monitored not only with a system such as a low pressure alarm, but also with another system with a functioning alarm such as a capnograph or spirometer. The pulse oximeter can then act as the final "safety net". 8 It is interesting that 16 incidents involving loss of circuit integrity were detected by "ventilator chatter". Systems using a bag compressed by a pressure-cycled ventilator (such as a Bird) may have saved many patients from harm. Conversely, there are five incidents in this series in which the use of a descending bellows during expiration were associated with an unrecognised disconnection.
Finally, there were nine incidents in which the detection of a ventilation problem was impeded by an alarm being switched "off". If possible, monitoring equipment should be self-activating and any change from the normal alarm limit settings should be clearly and actively displayed so that unusual settings can not act as a trap for the unwary anaesthetist.
